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Developing countries are emerging as frequent and active users of antidumping 
instrument. The thesis exploits a huge panel dataset of 8 developing countries filing 
against 46 affected countries in 54 industries ISIC revision 3 over 9 years from 1996 
to 2004 as an attempt to examine the determinants of industry pursuit and receipt of 
antidumping protection in developing countries especially the relationship between 
antidumping investigations in filing countries and technology innovations in affected 
countries. Econometric models suggest that changing macroeconomic conditions 
influence antidumping behaviour. First, appreciation in filing countries’ currency leads 
to increases in number of antidumping initiations from 9.2% to 11.8%. In addition, 
when filing countries experience a slump in industry growth, they tend to raise 
antidumping investigations from 0.3% to 0.7%.  
The thesis also reports a negative relationship between antidumping use and tariff 
level in developing countries. The estimation results provide evidences that contribute 
to support the “antidumping as a protection tool” hypothesis. Technology innovation 
possessed by exporting countries is found to have positive impact on importing 
countries’ antidumping use after controlling for macroeconomic conditions. An 
increase of 100% in the output per employee raises the number of antidumping 
initiations by 77%. In addition, one unit increase in value added per employee makes 
the industries raise antidumping investigations by 12.37 times given that all other 
variables are at their mean. 
 v
 My empirical study makes two contributions to the little existing literature on 
developing countries’ antidumping use. First, I use a more comprehensive data set 
broken down in 54 industries to examine the filing pattern in developing countries. 
Second, I include a set of technological variables in order to explore the new 
determinants of antidumping use in developing countries. 
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1.1. Antidumping and administrative procedures  
Antidumping refers to a legal statue that allows for a remedy (typically an import 
duty) to offset the effects of dumping by foreign exporters. As General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs/ World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) rules require, two tests 
must be satisfied in order for a country to impose antidumping duties on foreign 
suppliers found guilty of dumping. First, domestic industry must be shown to have 
suffered from “material injury” (e.g., a declined in profitability) as a result of foreign 
imports. Second, the imports must be shown to be sold at price that is “less than fair 
value” (LTFV). There are two ways to determine the LTFV criterion. The first way is 
“price-based” method which is to show that the price charged in domestic market by 
the foreign competitors is below the price charged for same product in other markets. 
The other way is called “constructed –value” method which is to show that the price 
charged in the domestic market is below an estimate of cost plus a normal return. 
Although different countries have different procedures, antidumping investigation 
generally proceeds as follow. A domestic industry finds evidence of dumping by 
foreign competitors and provides it to its government’s antidumping authority (or 
authorities). There are two kinds of evidence matched the criteria mentioned above 
that domestic industry must submit to the authority: the evidence of foreign suppliers 
selling imports below the normal price and the evidence of petitioning domestic 
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industry suffering from dumped imports. The national authority (authorities) can 
consider material injury evidence from number of types of industry data, including 
“actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return 
on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the 
magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash 
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or 
investments”1. The authorities then calculate the extent to which imports have been 
dumped and have injured the domestic industry based on collected data from 
petitioners and foreign exporters. Findings of dumping and material injury will lead to 
the imposition of an antidumping duty which is often equal to the percent difference 
between the price of the dumped goods and fair value i.e. the dumping margin. Under 
WTO rules, antidumping cases must be reviewed at least every five years to determine 
whether an antidumping remedy is still appropriate given recent import activity in the 
subject product.  
There are relatively few antidumping disputes until 1980. Since before 1980, GATT 
did not require countries to report their data on antidumping activity, there is no exact 
number of worldwide cases for this period. However, some data can be given by 
considering research of some authors. Hufbauer (1999) found that during 1954-1974, 
less than 100 cases were brought in the United States and most were dismissed. Schott 
(1994) noted that in the 1960s, all GATT members investigate about 10 antidumping 
cases per year. However, the Tokyo Round concluded in 1979 which contained 
numerous amendments to the antidumping dispute, made the situation change 
significantly. There are two important amendments. First, the definition of “less than 
fair value” (LTFV) sales were broaden to capture not only the price discrimination but 
                                                 
1
 See WTO, 1995; Article 3.4 
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also sales below costs. After this, between one half and two thirds of US antidumping 
cases are initiated due to cost-based method (Clarida, 1996). One legal expert noted 
that cost-based antidumping petitions have become “the dominant feature of US 
antidumping law” (Horlick, 1989, p.136).2 Second was the change in the procedures 
involved in showing material injury to domestic firms. Kennedy Round Code had 
required that the dumped imports be “demonstrably the principal cause of material 
injury” before antidumping authorities can impose duties. In response to pressure from 
a number of developed countries, the Tokyo Round Code had to revise this provision 
to render such a demonstration unnecessary. These two amendments apparently 
changed the situation. The number of cases filed in the first three years following the 
Tokyo Round was almost as many as those filed during the entire decade of the 1970s. 
Overall, during 1980s more than 1600 cases were filed worldwide – a filing rate at 
least twice that of 1970s and 762 measures (almost 50 percent of the total cases) were 
taken.  
Until 1985, almost antidumping cases were reported by the four heavy users: 
Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States. These four users 
accounted for more than 99 percent of all filings during 1980 - 1985 (Finger, 1993). 
However, the Uruguay Round (GATT, 1994)3 that followed the Tokyo Round and 
                                                 
2
 Linsey (1999) provides strong evidence for Horlick’s view: over the 4 year period 1995-1998, only 4 
out of 141 LTFV calculations were based on a true price to price comparison. 
3
  The Uruguay Round (GATT, 1994) more precisely defined the rules and procedures of antidumping 
measures. It introduced more detailed procedures for initiating and conducting antidumping 
investigations in order to reduce discretion with respect to methods of determining dumping and injury 
margin, sunset clause and particular standards for applying in antidumping settlement. Higher standards 
in the initiation procedures of antidumping cases in the new Agreement was expected to restrain the use 
by member countries by making it more difficult to file complaints and to prove dumping and injury 
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came into effect in 1995 brought about the rise of new antidumping users which will 
be mentioned in detail in the following part. 
1.2. Emergence of developing countries as new antidumping users 
The reductions in tariff over the past 50 years have led governments to seek for other 
practices which are able to protect their domestic markets. In addition, the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations that concluded in 1995 has paved the way 
for the application of the three main contingent protection measures which are 
countervailing duties (CVD), antidumping and Safeguard. Out of these, antidumping 
instrument is the most widely-used one. Over the 1995-2000, the number of 
antidumping cases initiated accounted for 89.1% of the total cases4 pertaining to the 
three main contingent measures.  
Antidumping investigations have increased spectacularly in recent years. The number 
of such investigations launched in 1999 was more than double that of those started in 
1995. It increased from around 156 in 1995 to 358 in 1999
 
(WTO, 2001)5. Moreover, 
antidumping tool is no longer the protection measure which is primarily used by 
industrialized economies, mainly the US, Canada, EU and Australia (known as 
traditional antidumping users). It is now widely and actively used by many developing 
countries and countries in transition (known as new antidumping users). By the early 
1990s, the share of worldwide antidumping disputes accounted for by traditional users 
fell below one half and now stands about 30 percent6. Developing countries account 
                                                                                                                                             
and by strengthening the dispute settlement system (Krishna, 1997; Roitinger, 2003). Contrary to the 
expectation, the number of cases continued to grow. 
4
 Rowe and Maw (2001). Global protection report 2001, April 2001. 
 
5
 WTO (2001): Rules Division Antidumping Measures database, WTO Secretariat.   
 
6
 See Prusa and Li (2009) 
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for the bulk of the new AD activity. From 1995 to 1999, developing countries filed 
559 cases compared to the world total of 1029 cases7.  Table 1 shown below is one of 
the proofs for this trend. Among the top 20 antidumping users, 16 of them are 
developing countries. And the most frequent new user is India with 425 initiations 
over the 1995-2005.  
Table 1. Top 20 users of anti-dumping 1995-2005 (by initiations) 
 
Country Number of initiations Country Number of initiations 
India 425 Mexico 85 
United States 366 Korea, Rep. of 81 
European Union 327 Peru 60 
Argentina 204 Indonesia 60 
South Africa 197 Egypt 50 
Australia 179 New Zealand 46 
Canada 134 Malaysia 35 
China, P.R. 123 Thailand 34 
Brazil 122 Israel 33 
Turkey 101 Venezuela 31 
 
Source: WTO database 
 
 
Zanardi (2004) reported the number of antidumping initiated over 20 years from 1981 
to 2001 broken down by the investigating country. The data show that a total of 4,597 
investigations were initiated in the period 1981-2001. The distribution of users was 
heavily concentrated since the four largest users in 1981-2001 (Australia, Canada, the 
European Union and the United States) each had 2 digit share of number of 
investigations and together filed up to 64 percent of all antidumping cases. However 
the scenario is quite different if the focus is restricted to the recent years 1995-2001. 
                                                 
7
 See Prusa and Li (2009) 
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Among the largest users, there were quite a few new entries such as Argentina, India 
and South Africa which even had larger shares of initiations than Australia and 
Canada. Zanardi (2004) also reported the number of antidumping initiations in the 
period 1981-2001 broken down by groups of users: traditional users and new users 
which are developing countries. Although the traditional economies continue to be 
quantitatively the biggest users, growth in use is clearly coming from developing 
countries. One key different between antidumping use by developing and developed 
countries is the intensity of use. Finger, Ng, and Wangchuk (2002) and Prusa (2005) 
have shown that per dollar of imports antidumping usage by new users is much higher 
than by traditional users. Brazil’s intensity of use is five times higher than that of the 
US, India’s seven times and South Africa and Argentina’s are twenty times the US 
figure. 
Which developing countries are the most frequent and active antidumping users? From 
the table 1, some countries may be named. Table 2 provides a more precise look at the 
share of antidumping use between traditional users and some new users during the 
GATT and WTO period. The table documents the frequency of investigation and 
imposed measures by a number of members in GATT period and WTO period dating 
from 1996 to 2004 – the time period used for the econometric estimation in the thesis.  
Although the four traditional users of antidumping – the US, Australia, Canada and 
EU – were the dominant users in GATT period, filings account for more than 70% of 
reported cases, they no longer keep their position in the next decade. WTO period 
have marked an emergence of new AD users made up of developing countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey, the eight 
developing countries forming the sample of the thesis’s  empirical analysis.  
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Table 2. Country use of antidumping under GATT and WTO period 
 GATT period, 1985-1995 WTO period, 1996 -2004 
Country Number of AD 
investigations 
Number of AD 
investigations 




“New users” Developing countries in the empirical analysis 
Argentina 44 192 139 
Brazil 58 116 62 
China 0 112 78 
India 9 400 302 
Indonesia 0 60 23 
Mexico 123 79 69 
South Africa 47 161 96 
Turkey 74 89 77 
 
Subtotal 











Traditional users of antidumping 
Australia 447 172 54 
Canada 223 133 80 
European Union 364 303 193 
United States 475 354 219 
 
Subtotal 






















Total 2088 2810 1760 
 
Source: Data for the 1985-1995 use of antidumping is taken from Zanardi (2005, table 2. Data for the 
1996-2004 initiations and measures is taken from WTO (2005 a,b) 
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Of the total use of AD during the WTO’s first nine years, more than 43% of all new 
investigations and 48% of all new measures imposed8 are made up by these eight 
developing countries. This is a remarkable shift from the prior ten year period, when 
the four “historical” AD users initiated almost 73% of all antidumping investigations.  
1.3. Objective and Scope 
So far there have been quite a lot of research on traditional antidumping users 
especially the US and EU but little on new users.  However, the growth in use of AD 
by developing countries is getting more interest from researchers.  This thesis is aimed 
to explore the determinants of antidumping in developing countries. Furthermore, as 
Miyagiwa and Ohno (2006) suggested that there might have relationship between the 
antidumping investigations in filing countries and the technology innovations in 
affected countries, level of technology in exporting countries might be a good factor to 
explain antidumping behavior in developing countries. So far there has been no article 
examining this issue.  
The objectives of this thesis are: 
a. To examine the determinants of antidumping pattern in eight developing 
countries – the most active and frequent new users of antidumping.  
b. To study the possible relationship between antidumping investigations in 
developing countries and level of technology innovation in exporting countries.  
                                                 
8
 This is not to imply that these countries began to use antidumping instrument in 1995. As Zanardi 
(2004) reports, most had adopted antidumping legislation prior to WTO’s inception: Argentina (1972), 
India (1985), Mexico (1986), Brazil (1987), Turkey (1989), and Indonesia (1995). While most of these 
countries did not intensively use AD until after joining the WTO in 1995, there are several exceptions 
such as Mexico in 1987, Turkey in 1990 and Brazil in 1992. These countries undertook substantial trade 
liberalization measures prior to joining the WTO and increased their use of AD shortly thereafter. 
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The thesis will use industry–level data for the empirical analysis in order to capture a 
more precise insight of antidumping behavior by new users. Since the dependent 
variables are non negative count ones, panel negative binomial regression is employed 
to analyze the data.  
1.4. Organization of Thesis 
This thesis consists of five chapters, each covering an aspect of the research. The 
thesis is organized as follow. 
Chapter 1 describes the increasing trend of the use of antidumping instrument in 
developing countries which are known as the new AD users. The motivation for this 
research as well as the objectives and scope of this research are also mentioned in 
chapter 1.   
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on antidumping. It summarizes the findings as 
well as emphasizes on the gaps in existing research in order to find the new elements 
for this work on antidumping in developing countries. Chapter 2 also highlights the 
contribution of the thesis to existing literature on developing countries’ use of 
antidumping policy. 
Chapter 3 mentions the data sources and the method of constructing dependent and 
independent variables for the empirical models. This chapter also refers to the choice 
of regression methodology and predicts the effect of each regressor on the dependent 
variable.  
Chapter 4 reports the empirical regression results. It highlights the main findings on 
antidumping practice in developing countries. In addition, chapter 4 also examines the 
sensitiveness of the regression results when dependent variable changes.  
 10
Chapter 5 summarizes the significant findings and the corresponding conclusions as 





As mentioned in the previous part, so far almost all studies have focused on traditional 
antidumping users especially the US and EU. There is little research on developing 
countries’ use of antidumping. However, the existing studies on USA and EU have 
generated useful insights into the methods, effects, determinants of antidumping 
pattern and many of these insights might be applicable across all antidumping regimes 
including new antidumping users. Thus, existing research on traditional users will also 
be reviewed in this chapter. 
2.1. Literature review of antidumping studies  
In this part, I will summarize the findings of existing papers according to the two sets 
of determinants of antidumping use: the macroeconomic determinants and trade 
related determinants.  
2.1.1. Macroeconomic effect on antidumping use 
Feinberg (1989) can be cited as the earliest research work on effects of 
macroeconomic determinants on antidumping filing pattern. Feinberg examines the 
effect of exchange rate movements on US antidumping filings across four import 
source countries (Brazil, Japan, South Korea and Mexico) over 24 quarters from 1982 
through 1987. The paper finds that a depreciation in US dollar against foreign 
currency will lead to a significant increase in number of antidumping investigations, 
especially those against Japan. The reason for this phenomenon is that when US dollar 
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is weak i.e. one dollar can be exchanged for less foreign currency, the price of 
importing goods will be lower in terms of foreign currency (the exporters’ currency) 
which is the price used by the USDOC to determine dumping. Thus, if there is 
imperfect pass-through of exchange rate or foreign firms are slow in adjusting prices, 
the chances of finding dumping and being investigated rise.  
Also using data on US (quarterly data over the period of 1975-2000), Raafat and 
Salehizadeh (2002) use the pass-through period concept to capture the effect of 
currency fluctuations over time on US import prices which may in turn lead to the 
imposition of antidumping charges against imports. The finding for the entire sample 
period is that a depreciation in US dollar reflects an increase in number of 
antidumping investigations which is consistent with findings of Feinberg (1989). Then 
the authors divide the data into two subsets: 1975-1992 and 1993-2000 period. The 
findings for 1975-1992 sample is similar to that for the entire dataset, however, the 
result for 1993-2000 is reversed. Although US dollar has been recorded sustained 
periods of appreciation against most other currencies, antidumping cases in the US 
have risen. Thus they come to conclude that antidumping laws fail to properly account 
for floating rate. 
Knetter and Prusa (2003) revisited this issue and reported substantially different 
findings. Firstly, they develop a model and explain the effect of exchange rate on 
antidumping filings in opposite manner to that of Fienberg (1989). They show that 
exchange rate can affect either material injury or less than fair value (LTFV) test. 
When domestic currency appreciates i.e. foreign currency weakens, the foreign firm’s 
cost in terms of domestic currency will be lower. Hence as a normal response, it will 
lower the price of exporting goods. This will lead to increase chances of being found 
causing material injury for foreign firm hence increase number of antidumping 
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investigations against it. Knetter and Prusa (2003) test this with a dataset on 4 
traditional antidumping from 1980 through 1998. In contrast with Feinberg (1989), 
they find strong evidence on a positive relationship between an appreciation in 
domestic currency and number of antidumping filings against exporting countries. 
They also reexamined the dataset of Feinberg (1989) and conclude that Feinberg ‘s 
finding is very sensitive to the sample chosen. Furthermore, Knetter and Prusa (2003) 
also find that decline in filing countries’ GDP growth rate will lead to an increase in 
antidumping activity which is consistent with Leidy (1997) who uses a much smaller 
sample of US aggregate filings. 
It is clear to see that the above research only use aggregate data and only concentrate 
on traditional users which are developed countries, especially the US. However, they 
give the insight that macroeconomic factors might also have impact on antidumping 
use in developing countries like they do in developed countries.  
Mah and Kim (2006) examine the relationship between macroeconomic variables and 
the number of investigations of antidumping duties in Korea from the first half of 1987 
to second half of 2003. Korea began to investigate antidumping duties in the late 
1980s, according to GATT statistics and is among the earliest developing countries 
using antidumping policy. The methodology that the authors use in their paper is 
different from previous papers’. While previous work such as Baldwin and Steagall 
(1994)10, Knetter and Prusa (2003) and Lee and Mah (2003)11 used regression analysis 
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 This paper investigates the economic factor that best explain the decisions of the International Trade 
Commission in administering the provisions of US antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard law 
during the 1980s. Probit regression is employed to estimate the econometric models.  
11
 The study examines whether and how the institutional changes as well as macroeconomic conditions 
influence the US International Trade Commission’s injury decisions. Using OLS regression, the 
empirical evidences show that the percentages of the Commissioners’ affirmative injury decisions are 
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to examine the effect of macroeconomic factors on antidumping filings, the paper 
concerns of stationarity issue in dealing with the time series data. They use the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Peron tests to reveal how stationary the series 
are. Then Johansen’s (1988) method is performed and shows that there is a long run 
equilibrium relationship between antidumping duties and real GDP growth rate. The 
error correction model provides evidence that protection measures such as 
antidumping duties lead to slow down the overall economic activities in Korea. 
Bown (2008) exploits a newly available and industry-level data to explain the 
determinants of antidumping use by nine of the new users which are developing 
countries in the 1995-2002 period. The nine countries used in econometric models are 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela. 
The author uses maximum likelihood to estimate a binomial probit model that 
examines the binary decision of whether to pursue an antidumping investigation in a 
given year. The study provides evidence that the use of antidumping in developing 
countries is consistent with industry characteristics predicted by the WTO’s 
evidentiary requirements and is impacted by macroeconomic shocks. The industries 
which are more likely to use antidumping have following characteristics: they are 
larger, they face substantial import competition and declining industry output. Bown 
(2008) also finds that exchange rate and fluctuations in GDP growth rate have impact 
on antidumping use in developing countries. The result is quite consistent with 
findings for developed countries users. Appreciation in exchange rate will lead to an 
                                                                                                                                             
positively influenced by increased import penetration ratios. The Democrat Commissioners are shown 
to be more sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic conditions than the Republican Commissioners 
are.  
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increase in antidumping use and decline in GDP growth rate will make domestic firms 
file more antidumping cases against their foreign rivals. 
Macroeconomic factors seem to be used quite often as explanatory variables for 
examining antidumping filing behavior by developed countries as well as developing 
countries. However, the above works except Bown (2008) makes use of quite 
aggregated dataset which may cause difficulties in exploring determinants of filing 
pattern in industry level. To overcome this issue and thanks to new availability of data, 
Bown (2008) makes an attempt to empirically examine the industrial use of 
antidumping in developing countries using a 3 digit ISIC revision 2 industrial dataset. 
Since the paper classify industries according to ISIC revision 2, it can only examine 
the 28 manufacturing industries. In addition, among the 9 developing countries under 
examination, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela do not show that they are as frequent 
users as others such as China or South Africa12.  
2.1.2. Trade effect on antidumping use 
Brander and Krugman (1983) might be cited as the earliest research work on the use of 
antidumping. The paper argued that oligopolistic rivalry between firms makes it 
natural for reciprocal dumping to happen:  each firm dumps into other firm’s home 
market. The authors assumed there are two identical countries, one domestic and one 
foreign and each country has one firm producing similar commodity. The main idea is 
that each firm serves each country as a separate market and therefore the profit-
maximizing quantity for each market will be chosen separately by each firm. The 
model provides evidence on correlation between two phenomena: intra-industry trade 
                                                 
12
 See table 2 
 16
and dumping. Once firms are selling both in their home market and foreign market, 
dumping is likely to happen. And such trade is referred to as “reciprocal dumping”.  
Recently researchers have paid more attention on antidumping and trade liberalization. 
And what is used most often to present trade liberalization is the change in tariff level. 
Aggarwal (2004) use a panel data analysis of 99 countries over 1980-2000 to examine 
how change in tariff rate and some macroeconomic variables influence the use of 
antidumping in developed and developing countries. Developed countries are 
categorized as OECD and non-OECD high income countries. Twenty years’ data are 
divided in four time periods of 5 years each to avoid the problem of year to year 
fluctuations. The study finds strong evidence that change in tariff rates has negative 
relationship with antidumping filings in developing countries. Meanwhile, reduction in 
tariff rates does not show significant impact on antidumping investigations by 
developed countries. In sum, trade pressures, tariff rate reductions and creating 
retaliatory capabilities seem to motivate the use of antidumping by developing 
countries while domestic macroeconomic pressures such as growth rate of import and 
growth rate of industrial value addition influence antidumping initiations in developed 
countries.  
Moore and Zanardi (2008) examine how significant trade liberalization can influence 
the use of antidumping in a large set of countries. Trade liberalization is defined as the 
percentage change in 3 digit ISIC revision 2 sectoral applied tariffs. The study makes 
use of a newly developed database including 29 developing and 7 developed countries 
from 1991 through 2002. After controlling for time varying sectoral information as 
well as macroeconomic conditions, the study find that cut down on tariff rate is 
negatively correlated with the use of antidumping by heavy users among developing 
countries but not to have any impact on the use of antidumping by less active 
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developing countries and developed countries users. In particular, a one standard 
deviation decrease in applied tariff rate will increase the probability of observing an 
antidumping initiation by 32 percents. The reason for this might be due to the fact that 
other developing countries initiated much fewer antidumping cases and developed 
countries already have low tariff rates over the entire period covered i.e. the 
adjustment coming from trade liberalization in developed countries took place in early 
years. These findings are similar with those in Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) who 
analyzes the relationship between bound tariff and antidumping activity in the sense that 
the later paper also finds a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and the use of 
antidumping across all developing countries in their sample. However, an unexpected 
negatively significant correlation across developed countries has been reported which is 
different from findings in Moore and Zanardi’s paper.  
Bown and Tovar (2008) uses India’s exogenously-induced tariff reform in the 1990s to 
test for a particular relationship between trade liberalization and the imposition of new 
import protection policy such as antidumping and safeguards. The study exploit cross-
product variation and report evidence on the link between India’s resort to 
antidumping and safeguards protection in the early 2000s and the size of its tariff 
reform in 1990-1997. As the first step, the paper estimates structural determinants of 
India’s import protection using the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model. Evidence in 
support of the model estimated on India’s pre-reform (1990) is found. However, there 
is no support for model estimated on India’s post-reform. As the second step, the paper 
uses a reduced form approach, additional margin of the underlying data, the panel 
nature of the available data and the exogeneity of India’s 1990-1997 trade 
liberalization to provide additional evidence that the larger the tariff reduction, the 
more likely the product seeks and receives new import protection under antidumping 
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and safeguard policy. The study finds that one standard deviation increase in the tariff 
cut in 1990-1997 will lead to an increase by 27 percent in probability of opening an 
antidumping initiation in the early 2000s. Evidence support for the fact that products 
with larger tariff cuts during trade reform receive higher antidumping duties in the 
early 2000s is also found. These results hold even after the authors control for other 
potential determinants of antidumping use such as retaliation motives, injury/dumping 
variables, the “tariff overhang” among others. Finally, the paper provides some 
evidence that those products with larger reduction in tariff rate are more likely to have 
their antidumping measures extended beyond five years. 
2.2. Further contribution in the thesis 
What can be firstly noted through existing literature is that almost research works are 
done with quite aggregated data normally country–level data. This might be attributed 
to lack of disaggregated information on antidumping activities. Thanks to Global 
Antidumping database maintained by Chad P. Bown, a quite disaggregated data on 
antidumping use by 30 WTO members has been released. Therefore, the thesis takes 
advantage of this newly available data to make a more comprehensive research on 
antidumping filing behavior by developing countries which have been recently 
emerged as new antidumping regimes. As one improvement from Bown (2008), the 
industries are classified according to 3 digit ISIC revision 3. Thus, totally there are 54 
manufacturing industries under examination compared to 28 industries as in Bown’s 
paper. It is expected that the result will be more comprehensive when the detail level 
of data increases. Eight new users developing countries are picked up to form the 
sample used in this thesis. Instead of Colombia, Peru and Venezuela as in Bown’s 
sample, China and South Africa are chosen since they are extremely active 
antidumping users compared to those three countries. The set of explanatory variables 
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used in Bown’s paper mainly concern about the WTO’s evidentiary requirements for 
antidumping while the thesis aim to find out how technology innovation in exporting 
firms might affect antidumping use in developing countries after controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions and trade-related issues. Thus, although the thesis and 
Bown (2008) have same interest in developing countries’ antidumping activities, the 
approach is different.  
Macroeconomic factors such as real bilateral exchange rate and GDP growth rate are 
also controlled in the thesis’s econometric models. However, since the data set being 
used in the thesis is industry-level one, GDP growth rate will be replaced with industry 
growth rate in order to capture the more “industry-specific” effect. Brander and 
Krugman (1983) theoretically explain the relationship between intra-industry trade and 
dumping. It suggests that intra industry trade might be a factor explaining the 
antidumping filing behavior. In this research, I will empirically examine this kind of 
correlation by taking intra-industry trade index as an explanatory variable. As far as I 
know, there has been so far no empirical research on the link of antidumping and intra-
industry trade level.  
Other than macroeconomic and trade related variables, so far other variables have been 
ignored. In the thesis, I try to exploit a new set of variables. Miyagiwa and Ohno 
(2006) theoretically reported evidence on the impact of technology innovations on 
antidumping protection. The main idea behind their article is that in industries where 
technologies change rapidly and continuously firms may not know accurately about 
their rivals’ production costs. In such cases, a foreign firm that possesses a new 
technology may find it worthwhile to export more than the normal quantities to signal 
that it has low cost, even to the extent that the price fall below cost i.e. foreign firm 
dumps into the home firms’ market. In addition, Niels (2000) showed that 
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antidumping users often target R&D intensive sectors such as primary metals, 
chemicals, consumer electronics and mechanical engineering. In sum, the paper 
suggests a relationship between antidumping use in developing countries and 
technology innovation in exporting countries. So far, there has been no empirical 
research examining this issue. Thus, technology variables will be taken into account to 
explore the antidumping filing pattern in developing countries. This improvement 
together with those mentioned above can be considered as contribution of the thesis to 











METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
3.1. The construction of dependent variables 
The antidumping data used for empirical analysis in the thesis is the industry-level 
information on antidumping initiations and final measures imposed. Only the 
industries belong to manufacturing sector are taken into account and they are classified 
according to 3-digit ISIC Rev.310 (International standard industrial classification of all 
economic activities, Revision 3). There are 59 manufacturing industries under the ISIC 
rev.3 at 3 digit level11. However in the thesis, some of the industries are omitted due to 
lack of data 12 . Thus, totally there are 54 industries at 3 digit ISIC rev 3 under 
examination. The information on number of antidumping initiations and punishment 
measures is obtained from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2007)13.  
                                                 
10 The International Standard of Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) code was 
developed by the UN as a standard way of classifying economic activities. The ISIC code groups 
together enterprises if they produce the same type of goods or service or if they use similar processes 
(i.e. the same raw materials, process of production, skills or technology). The ISIC system is now used 
widely by governments and international bodies as a way if classifying data according to economic 
activity. Revision 3 of the code was published in 1989. Most of countries now report to this revision. 
11
 Division 37-recycling is not counted though it also belongs to manufacturing sector.  
12
 The industries omitted include: 182-Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur; 201-
Sawmilling and planing of wood; 223- Reproduction of recorded media; 231-Manufacture of coke oven 
products and 273-Casting of metals.  
13
 See http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/ad/ 
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The eight most active and frequent new antidumping users which are developing 
countries are picked up for the empirical analysis. They are Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. The statistics on these eight 
countries’ antidumping initiations and imposed measures are presented in table 2. The 
analysis focuses on antidumping investigations initiated during 1996-2004 since after 
1 January 1995, the Antidumping Agreement came into effect and the rule on DSU 
enforcement become consistent across countries 14 . And the antidumping data for 
Argentina, China, and Indonesia is reported only from 1996. The information on 
products subject to antidumping investigations and imposed measures is reported 
based on HS 1996, 1998, 2002 depending on the reporting countries. Thus, I have to 
use a HS – ISIC rev 3 concordance table to concord the 6-digit HS import data to the 3 
digit ISIC rev 3 level, allowing each 6-digit HS product to be allocated in only one 
industry.  
Two different versions of dependent variable are used in the empirical analysis, one of 
which is the number of industry-level antidumping initiations during 1996-2004 and 
the second is the number of industry-level measures finally imposed. The reason for 
using two different dependent variables is that typically, domestic firms rather than 
governments initiate antidumping petitions so that the number of initiations reflects 
requests for protection from import-competing firms whereas the final imposition of 
antidumping measures reflects the decisions of governments to grant protection i.e the 
actual protection toward domestic producers.  Therefore, using these two measures 
will let us check the sensitiveness of the empirical results, whether the estimation 
results are different if dependent variable changes.  
                                                 
14
 Prior to 1995, international enforcement varied across countries under the GATT and thus 
antidumping cases are subject to their own dispute settlement procedures. 
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3.2. The construction of explanatory variables 
The construction of many of the explanatory variables used for empirical estimation 
requires disaggregated annual industry-level data. These data are obtained from the 
Economic Research Service of the US - Department of Agriculture, World Integrated 
Trade Solution (WITS) database maintained by World Bank and United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).  
3.2.1. Macroeconomic explanatory variables 
Economic researchers recently have noted that macroeconomic conditions affect the 
likelihood of antidumping use over time. For example, Knetter and Prusa (2003) 
reported evidence that GDP growth rate and real exchange rate have impacts on the 
use of antidumping by the four historical users15. These insights are used to construct 
macroeconomic variables for the developing countries analysis in the thesis.  
Real bilateral exchange rate can cause a positive impact on the use of antidumping.  
Consider here the case of appreciation in domestic currency. Real exchange rate is 
defined as foreign currency per unit of domestic currency16.  Thus, appreciation in 
domestic currency means an increase in real exchange rate. When domestic currency 
strengthens, domestic firms are more likely to be materially injured. This logic is 
graphically represented in figure 1 which is similar to the one in Knetter and Prusa 
(2003). Figure 1 graphs the foreign supplier’s response to a real depreciation in home 
currency.  As foreign firm is servicing the domestic market, the demand curve 
represents domestic market.  
                                                 
15
 They are the US, EU, Australia and Canada. 
16
 Foreign currency and domestic currency are converted to real value. As in the thesis, the base year for 
real exchange rate is 2005 according to the data source. 
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When the domestic currency appreciates (i.e. foreign currency weakens), the foreign 
firm’s cost in terms of domestic currency will be lower, being represented by the 
downward shift of  MC0 to MC1.  The normal response of foreign exporters is to lower  
 
 
domestic currency price of exporting goods. This could reduce the market share of 
domestic producers, hence their profit. Consequently, this pricing behaviour would 
increase the chance of being accused of causing material injury for domestic firms. 
Therefore, it will increase the likelihood that home firms would open an antidumping 
investigation on foreign firm. Based on this discussion, it is expected that real 
exchange rate will have positive correlation with dependent variables. The Economic 
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Figure 1. Reaction of foreign supplier when importing  
country’s currency appreciates 
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bilateral real exchange rate since they report real exchange rates in a consistent fashion 
for virtually all countries in the world.  
Industry growth rates in filing countries are expected to be negatively related with 
the dependent variables. In previous literature, such as Knetter and Prusa (2003) or 
Bown (2008), authors often use GDP growth rate in filing countries as an explanatory 
variable. However, this thesis exploits an industry-level dataset; thus, industry growth 
rate is used instead in order to capture the industry-specific impact on antidumping use 
in developing countries. A slump in industries’ activity in the importing countries 
makes it more likely for importing firms to perform poorly which may facilitate a 
finding of material injury. In addition, as a normal pricing behaviour, foreign firms 
would reduce price of exporting goods to maintain their market share and revenue 
when the industry growth in importing countries is slow. Domestic firms, in order to 
combat the intensive competition from foreign firm, might increase antidumping 
investigations on their rivals.  
Industry growth rate in exporting countries is less clear on how it impacts the 
antidumping filing decision. One possibility is that a weak foreign industry increases 
the likelihood for foreign firms to cut down prices to maintain the overall output 
levels. This would reduce the profit of domestic firms in home market. Thus, this 
variable is expected to have negative impact on antidumping initiation and decision.  
The data for industry growth rate is obtained from Industrial Statistics Database 
(UNIDO). In fact, this database reports only the nominal data on industry output. The 
data is then converted to real value using GDP deflator with year 2000 as the base 
year. Industry growth rates in either importing or exporting countries are then 
calculated accordingly. 
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3.2.2. Trade explanatory variables 
Tariff rate has recently been taken into account in examining the antidumping filing 
behaviour such as in Aggarwal (2004) or Bown (2008). This thesis also use tariff rate 
as an explanatory variable to explain the antidumping filing initiation and decision in 
developing countries.  
Bourgeois and Messerlin (1998) made a review of the antidumping cases initiated by 
the EC for 1980-1987 and reported that the industries most frequently involved are 
those that have a low MFN tariff. In the thesis, I use simple average applied tariff rate 
that importing countries levy on each exporting country. Due to trade liberalization, 
tariff has been gradually reduced, home producers are facing an import surge. Hence, 
they would adopt antidumping instrument to reduce the intense competition from 
foreign producers. One more reason is that tariff rate has been reduced; consequently 
tariff revenue in developing countries is also less. These governments may want to use 
antidumping measures as a method to compensate for the reduction in their revenue, 
concurrently follow the trade liberalization progress. Thus, tariff rate is expected to 
inversely related with antidumping initiations and measures imposed by developing 
countries. The data for tariff rate can be achieved from World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) database.  
Brander and Krugman (1983) provided possible explanations for the two phenomena: 
intra-industry trade and dumping. The idea is that when firms are selling in both 
markets, “reciprocal dumping” is likely to happen, i.e. each firm dumps into other 
firms’ home market. Thus, intra-industry trade (IIT) might be a factor that impact on 
the antidumping filing decision in developing countries. To calculate the IIT index, the 




IITij: Intra- industry trade between country i and country j 
Xij : Export of industry i to country j 
Mij : Import of industry i from country j 
The larger the GL index is the higher degree of two way trade between two countries. 
The IIT is expected to have positive impact on dependent variables. The data on 
import and export value between pair of country can be found in World Integrated 
Trade Solution (WITS) database.  
3.2.3. Technology explanatory variables 
In the thesis, three variables are used to capture the sense of technology in exporting 
countries. They are output per employee, value added per employee and value 
added per unit of capital ratios. The higher these ratios are the more innovative 
technology exporting countries are possessing.  
The number of employees is including all persons engaged other than working 
proprietors, active business partners and unpaid family workers.  
The measure of output normally reported is the census concept, which covers only 
activities of an industrial nature. The value of census output in the case of estimates 
compiled on a production basis comprises: (a) the value of all products of the 
establishment; (b) the net change between the beginning and the end of the reference 
period in the value of work in progress and stocks of goods to be shipped in the same 
condition as received; (c) the value of industrial work done or industrial services 
 |  |
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rendered to others; (d) the value of goods shipped in the same condition as received 
less the amount paid for these goods; and (e) the value of fixed assets produced during 
the period by the unit for its own use.  
The measure of value added normally reported is the census concept, which is defined 
as the value of census output less the value of census input, which covers: (a) value of 
materials and supplies for production (including cost of all fuel and purchased 
electricity); and (b) cost of industrial services received (mainly payments for contract 
and commission work and repair and maintenance work).  
Gross fixed capital formation refers to the value of purchases and own-account 
construction of fixed assets during the reference year less the value of corresponding 
sales. The fixed assets covered are those (whether new or used) with a productive life 
of one year or more. New fixed assets include all those that have not been previously 
used in the country. Thus, newly imported fixed assets are considered new whether or 
not used before they were imported. Used fixed assets include all those that have been 
previously used within the country. Transactions in fixed assets include: (a) land; (b) 
buildings, other construction and land improvements; (c) transport equipment; and (d) 
machinery and other equipment 
The data for industry-level employee, output, value added and capital is taken from 
Industrial Statistics Database (UNIDO). These explanatory variables are expected to 
positively related to dependent variables.   
3.2.4. Other control variables 
The thesis includes the binary indicator for whether the industry pursuit prior 
antidumping investigation or received antidumping protection in the previous year. 
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The variable takes value equal to 1 if the industry involved antidumping use in the 
previous year and 0 otherwise. Blonigen and Haynes (2002) found evidence on 
“continuing filing” which means that once exporting firm was filed antidumping case 
or punished by any antidumping measure in the previous year, it is more likely that 
this firm will be investigated again in following year. Thus, the variable is expected to 
have positive sign.  
The dummy variables for filing countries are also included in the regression to control 
for unobservable country-specific differences.  Table 3 presents summary statistics for 
the explanatory variables used in the formal econometric models. 
3.3. Regression methodology 
Since the number of filings is a non-negative count variable, panel negative binomial 
regression which is primarily a Poisson model with more flexible error structure is 
adopted to estimate the relationship between the number of industry-level antidumping 
initiations and measures imposed with the above explanatory variables. The Poisson 
regression model, a non-linear model, is widely used for such kind of data. The 
distribution takes the following form. 
Prob ( ) (exp( ) ) / !ityu it it itY y yl l= = -      1,2,3,...,ity =  
Where 
( )it itE y l=   and  ( )it itV y l=  
Typically, the Poisson regression model is given by: 
log Xl b=  
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Number of industry-level antidumping initiations  0.005 0.098 0 10 
Number of industry-level antidumping measures imposed  0.004 0.081 0 6 
Explanatory variables 
Continuing filings [+] 0.005 0.068 0 1 
Continuing measures imposed [+] 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Intra-industry trade index [+] 0.211 0.288 0 1 
Real exchange rate [+] 100.600 662.383 0.00003 13310.42 
Industry growth rate in importing country [-] 26.291 103.647 -100 2680.509 
Industry growth rate in exporting country [-] 18.251 90.824 -100 2680.509 
Applied tariff rate [-] 15.901 11.568 0 148.83 
Output per employee [+] 0.156 0.297 0.00005 6.215 
Value added per employee [+] 0.049 0.079 -0.017 1.826 
Value added per unit of capital [+] 13.789 115.6 -80.499 7973.714 
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β is estimated either by an iterative non-linear weighted least square method or by a 
maximum likelihood method. 
However, one feature of Poisson model that is frequently violated in application is that 
using this kind of regression requires equivalence between mean and variance. The 
issue of over dispersion where the variance of observed counts is larger than the mean, 
however, is very common in empirical research. It is certainly true regarding the data 
reported in table 3. In this situation, an often used alternative suggested for the Poisson 
model is the negative binomial model, which allows for over dispersion. It is derived 
by generalizing the Poisson model by introducing an individual, unobserved effect into 
the conditional mean µ i such that 
log log logit it itum l= + . 
The negative binomial takes the form, 
log it it itx em b= +  
Where  eit reflects either a specification error or a cross-sectional heterogeneity and 
exp(eit) is gamma distributed. The distribution of yit conditional on xi and uit remains 
Poisson with conditional mean and variance µ it: 
( | , ) ((exp( ))( ) ) / !ityit it it it it it it itf y x u u u yl l= -  
The distribution has mean λ and variance ( 1 / )l q+ . 
In addition to the method regression, one important specification issue is the lag 
structure of the regressors. Normally, reporting countries analyze the pricing 
behaviour of foreign firms over the year prior to the filing of the case. This is called 
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the investigation period. In fact, the industry must be suffering material injury during 
the investigation period. The authorities will then calculate the detailed injury margin 
based on the information collected during this period which is 1 year preceding the 
antidumping filing date. Due to this practice, all of explanatory variables used in the 





4.1. Determinants of antidumping protection in developing countries 
We have a panel data set with 8 filing countries, 47 affected countries (46 for each 
filing country), 54 industries classified by 3 digit ISIC revision 3 and 9 years. The 
dependent variable is the number of initiations that 8 filing countries filed against 
affected countries in each industry in each year. The independent variables are 
described in table 4. 
The estimation result is reported in table 5. In this table, coefficients are reported as 
“incidence rate ratios” (IRR). The incidence rate ratio is the ratio of the counts 
predicted by the model when the variable of interest is one unit above its mean value 
and all other variables are at their mean. Thus, if the IRR is 1.50, then a one unit 
increase in the explanatory variable would increase counts by 50% when all other 
variables are at their mean. The IRR exceeds one for all explanatory variables which 
have positive impact on dependent variable and is less than one for variables having 
negative impact.  Z-statistics are reported for a test of null hypothesis that the IRR is 





Table 4. List of explanatory variables 
Variable Description 
CFI 
Continuing investigations (based on initiations), a 
dummy variable. 
Rxr(-1) Real bilateral exchange rate, lagged 1 year 
IIT(-1) Intra industry trade index, lagged 1 year 
Tariff(-1) 
Simple average applied tariff  level that the filing 
country imposes on imported goods, lagged 1 year. 
Fgrowth(-1) Industry growth rate in filing countries, lagged 1 year. 
Wgrowth(-1) 
Industry growth rate in affected countries, lagged 1 
year 
Output/employee(-1) Output per employee , lagged 1 year 
Va/employee(-1) Value added per employee, lagged 1 year 
Va/capital(-1) Value added per unit of capital, lagged 1 year 
 
4.1.1. Antidumping and macroeconomic conditions 
The findings suggest that macroeconomic factors have significant impacts on 
antidumping investigation pattern in developing countries. In specification (1), I 
include only the macroeconomic variables to examine the effect of macro conditions 
on new AD users’ filing. Real exchange rate is found to be significant at 1% level and 
positively related to the dependent variable. Real bilateral exchange rate is defined as 
foreign currency per unit of home currency. Thus, an increase in exchange rate reflects 
an appreciation of the filing country’s currency. The estimation result in specification 
(1) shows that an appreciation of 100% in real exchange rate will increase openings of 
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antidumping procedures in developing countries by 9.2%. The bilateral real exchange 
rate is also significant at 1% level in other models and consistently has positive impact 
on the number of industry-level antidumping initiations in developing countries. The 
power of impact is somewhat similar in every model, ranging from 9.2% to 11.8%. 
The finding on impact of real exchange rate on AD filings pattern in developing 
countries is consistent with existing literature on developed countries such as Knetter 
Michael M. and Thomas J. Prusa (2003).  
As mentioned in the previous part, industries are more likely to pursue an antidumping 
investigation if they face a slump in industry activities. The industry growth rate in 
filing countries shows a negative impact on the number of industry-specific AD 
investigations. Thus, this result is consistent with theory. When the domestic industry 
is weak, profit of home firm is reduced. Therefore home firms tend to increase AD 
investigations on foreign firms. As the specification (1)’s result suggests, a decline in a 
unity of the industry growth rate will increase the number of industry–level AD filings 
by 0.3% (the IRR for filing country’s industry growth rate is 0.997). Although the 
estimated sign of the filing country industry growth rate variable does not change, the 
statistical significance is increased across specifications when more variables are 
added in. The level of impact reflected through the degree of IRR is different across 
specifications; however, the change is not considerable. In all estimation models, 
growth rate of industry in filing country consistently have negative impact on 
antidumping investigation pattern with the IRR ranging from 0.994 to 0.997. 
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Table 5. Negative binomial estimation of developing countries’ industry – specific antidumping initiation decision, 1996-2004 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CFI 
 3.206*** 





  5.33*** 
(4.67) 
6.183*** 
(  5.03) 
5.089*** 
(4.24) 
  4.748*** 
(3.93) 





































































Output/employee(-1)    1.77*** (2.82)   
1.942*** 
 (2.76)  
Va/employee(-1)     12.37*** (3.73)  
 16.673*** 
(3.42) 
Va/capital(-1)      0.999  (-0.13) 
0.999 
(-0.15) 




- All specifications include random effect. Estimates are reported as “incidence rate ratio” (IRR). Z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant 
at 1, 5, 10 percent, respectively. 
- IRR for dummy variables for filing countries are not included. 
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Affected country’s industry growth rate is not statistically significant in all of the 
estimation specifications. The IRR estimates are almost equal to 1.00 in every model 
which implies no relationship between the number of antidumping initiations in 
developing countries with industry growth rate in affected countries. It appears that 
domestic, but not foreign, industry recessions systematically provoke more filings.  
4.1.2. Antidumping and unfair trade 
Tariff variable is included in specification number (3) to number (8) to make 
regressions. Tariff variable is significant at 1% level in every model. The result shows 
that tariff level is highly negatively correlated with the number of industry-specific 
antidumping initiations. This means that the more tariff level is reduced, the more 
antidumping cases are filed. One unit decrease in tariff level will increase the number 
of AD initiations in developing countries by 7-8% given that other variables are at 
their mean. 
Recently there is an argument on the role of antidumping legislation which is about 
whether antidumping is genuinely concerned with “unfair” trade practices by foreign 
exporters or antidumping is just a tool to protect domestic producers. Proponents of 
the antidumping system such as Mastel (1998) argue that antidumping law is 
necessary to combat “unfair” trade. However, there is a growing consensus that in 
many cases antidumping policy is an industrial policy tool in disguise. Rather than 
being targeted at keeping “unfair” trade out, it is often aimed at fostering the interests 
of inefficient domestic producers, irrespective of the intent of importers (Shin, 1994)16. 
                                                 
16
 Shin (1994) argues that less than 10% of antidumping cases are about predatory intent, arguably the 
only economic rationale for protection against dumped imports. 
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As a support for this hypothesis, Konings and Vandenbussche (2008), using a firm-
level datasets, found that antidumping protects “inefficient” industries.  
The finding on relationship between tariff and antidumping in developing countries in 
this thesis might consider as a little contribution to support for the “protection tool” 
hypothesis. Since tariff level has been reduced gradually, there would be more 
competition coming from foreign rivals. It seems that, in developing countries, 
antidumping policy is considered as a trade tool to protect their domestic markets. 
Until recently, firms in most of developing countries have been operating in highly 
protected environment. Overprotection in a long period of time bred inefficiency. 
Therefore, the shift in favour of competition-enhancing policies in these countries in 
the 1990s appears to have resulted in pressures from domestic industries to provide 
protection to be able to face with international competition. Authorities also seem to 
adopt antidumping-one of the contingent protection measures in order to reassure 
domestic industries that some form of “safety valve” remains in place.  
4.1.3. Antidumping and technology innovation 
In specification (4), (5), (6) I add in the variables output per employee, value added 
per employee and value added per unit of capital respectively to measure the effect of 
technology on antidumping filing in developing countries after controlling for 
macroeconomic and trade effect. These variables reflect technology innovations in the 
sense that the higher the ratios are, the higher the technology level given that other 
things equal. Out of three variables, only the first two are statistically significant in 
explaining antidumping investigation pattern by new users. Both variables are 
significant at 1% level with the IRR of 1.77 and 12.37 respectively. This result 
suggests that an increase of 100% in the output per employee will raise the number of 
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antidumping initiations by 77%. In addition, one unit increase in value added per 
employee will make the industries raise antidumping investigations by 12.37 times17 
given that all other variables are at their mean. The value added per unit of capital is 
not significant in explaining the antidumping filing behaviour in developing countries. 
Table 6 below provides correlation matrix between these three technology variables. 
Not surprisingly, output/employee(-1) and Va/employee(-1) variables are highly 
correlated. Thus, three variables are not included in one regression to avoid 
colinearity.  
Table 6. Correlation matrix among technology variables 
 Va/capital(-1) Output/employee(-1) Va/employee(-1) 
Va/capital(-1) 1.0000   
Output/employee(-1) 0.0101 1.0000  
Va/employee(-1) 0.0414 0.7136 1.0000 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
In specification (7) and (8), value added per unit of capital continues to show no 
relationship with dependent variable while the other two variables are significant at 
1% level and positively correlated with the number of industry-level antidumping 
initiations in developing countries. In sum, the filing behaviour by new users is 
impacted by productivity of worker and the value added that one worker can create in 
affected countries. This finding might partly explain for the increasing trend in intra-
developing countries antidumping actions i.e. developing countries investigate 
                                                 
17
 12.37 seems a large number while the maximum count for number of antidumping initiations is just 
10. However, it is noted that the minimum value for value added per employee is just 0.049 as 
illustrated in table 3. 
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antidumping against other developing countries18. Innovation in technology is more 
rapidly took place in developing countries. This does not mean that developed 
countries has lower production technology than developing countries but the 
innovation progress is rapid in the latter nations since they can apply know-how and 
modern technology from former countries.  
4.1.4. Antidumping and other explanatory variables 
In all of the models, continuing filing variable are positively significant at 1% level 
with an incidence rate ratio ranging from 3.2 to 6.4. This suggests that once the foreign 
firms were investigated antidumping in the previous year, they are likely to be 
investigated in the following year. The estimation result is consistent with findings in 
existing literature on continuing investigation such as Blonigen and Haynes (2002). 
We find evidence that supports theory of “reciprocal dumping” 19  that once firms sell 
in both markets, reciprocal dumping will happen. The intra industry trade (IIT) index 
is positively related to number of antidumping initiations in developing countries. This 
index is significant at 1% level with an IRR ranging from 3.1 to 3.9 which means that 
one unit increase in degree of intra industry trade between the filing country and the 
affected country will increase the number of  industry-level antidumping initiations by 
3.1 to 3.9 times given that all other variables are at their mean. Today approximately 
one forth of world trade has intra industry nature20 and this trend continues to increase. 
Thus, the finding on relationship between antidumping and two way trade might 
suggest a rise in number of antidumping cases all over the world. 
                                                 
18
 See Guash and Rajapatirana (1998). 
19
 See Brander and Krugman (1983) 
20
 See Seyied (2009) 
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4.2. Sensitiveness of empirical results as dependent variable changes 
Table 7 presents the empirical results as the dependent variable changes. In this case, 
the dependent variable is the number of industry-level cases which are imposed 
antidumping measures during 1996-2004 in order to verify whether industries are 
under actual protection from antidumping behaviour by foreign rivals. The same set of 
explanatory is used to estimate the effect on dependent variable except that the 
continuing filing variable is replaced with continuing measures imposed (CFM). 
Basically, the estimation result is not different with the previous one in terms of 
estimated sign and significance level 21 . However, industry growth rate in filing 
countries variable does not have as strong impact as it does in the regression with 
number of antidumping initiations as dependent variable. In the specification (1) and 
(2), it is not even significant in explaining the antidumping measure imposing 
behaviour in developing countries. Nevertheless, it become significant at 10% level 
when more explanatory variables are added in and also have negative impact on 
dependent variable as predicted.  
To summarize, whether examining a dependent variable defined as number of 
industry-level antidumping initiations or number of antidumping imposed measures, it 
is found that industries in developing countries are more likely to use antidumping 
when they i) face unfavourable macroeconomic conditions as measured by lower 
industry growth rate and appreciation in domestic currency; ii) gradually lower their 
tariff barrier iii) used to launch antidumping investigation against their rivals in the 
                                                 
21
 The IRR of CFM becomes large in specifications in table 7 compared with IRR of CFI in tale 6. This 
might be attributed to the lower standard deviation of CFM as illustrated in table 3. Furthermore, 
because of the pass-through effect, once foreign firm was imposed antidumping duty, it is more likely 
that it will be imposed duty in the following period. 
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previous time; iv) face competition from foreign firms which are exporting to 
domestic market as well as serving their own market; v) are not aware of the levels of 
technology currently used by the rivals hence can not verify the foreign firms’ 
production cost due to the innovation. 
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Table 7. Negative binomial estimation of developing countries’ industry – specific antidumping  
measure imposed decision, 1996-2004 







































































 0.945***  
(-3.96) 
Output/employee(-1)    1.504** (2.28)   
1.427*** 
 (2.34) 
Va/employee(-1)     6.252*** (3.68)  
 




- All specifications include random effect. Estimates are reported as “incidence rate ratio” (IRR). Z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
 denote significant at 1, 5, 10 percent, respectively. 





Antidumping has emerged as a global phenomenon and has been used actively and 
frequently by more than 60 countries all over the world (Prusa, 2001). If developed 
countries used to be dominant antidumping users in the 1980s, the 1990s marked the 
emergence of developing countries as new antidumping users. The thesis examines the 
determinants of antidumping filing across eight developing countries. How 
macroeconomic factors, trade variables and especially technology level can influence 
the use of antidumping by these new users. A panel data consists of 8 most active 
developing countries users filing against 46 affected countries in 54 industries ISIC 
revision 3 over 9 year period from 1996 to 2004 is used for the research. The study 
finds that macroeconomic conditions have significant impacts on the use of 
antidumping in developing countries. A real appreciation of the filing country’s 
currency will lead to a significant increase in antidumping use. Furthermore, it appears 
that when there is a downturn in industry activities, firms in these countries will open 
more antidumping investigations as a form of reducing competition from foreign 
exporters. Moreover, the more trade liberalisation developing countries get, the more 
heavily they use antidumping instrument. The study shows that one unit decrease in 
applied tariff level will increase the number of AD initiations in developing countries 
by 7-8% given that other variables are at their mean. One of the major findings in the 
thesis is the positive impact of production technology level used by exporters on 
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developing countries’ antidumping use. They tend to increase the antidumping 
activities against rivals whose technological innovation occurs frequently.  
Empirical evidence presented in the study has important implications. It is noted that 
the factors affecting antidumping use in developing countries (real exchange rate, 
industry growth, tariff change and exporter’s technology level) are out of their control. 
Thus, it strengthens the view that antidumping measures have gone beyond punishing 
unfair trade practices and creating level playing field as claim by the national 
antidumping authorities. Antidumping law seems to be used for a more political issue 
than an economic one. Developing countries are considering antidumping policy as a 
trade tool to protect their domestic firms from competition of foreign producers. 
Moreover, the increase in use of antidumping by developing countries raises the 
concern that trade liberalisation commitment they undertook as part of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations might be due to the fact that they can take advantage of 
antidumping law to off set the reduction in their tariff revenue resulted from 
liberalisation. Thus, it is important for WTO to amend the antidumping law so that it 
can address these possible issues.  
Blonigen and Bown (2003) discovers several instances of retaliatory use of 
antidumping among developed countries. Prusa and Skeath (2002) finds evidence on 
“tit-for-tat” retaliatory antidumping actions for both developed and developing 
countries.22 These papers suggest that retaliatory motives might be a good factor 
explaining antidumping behaviour in developing countries since they are 
predominately the target for investigations. However, constructing this kind of 
explanatory variables requires data on antidumping activities of 46 affected countries 
                                                 
22
 Retaliatory actions refer to countries filing antidumping specifically against those countries that have 
named them in the past. 
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against 8 filing countries in industry level. It is impossible at the present to collect 
these kinds of data since the Global Antidumping database – the most comprehensive 
one on industry-specific antidumping reports data for 30 countries only. Hence 
including retaliatory motive variable in the thesis will cause a loss of a number of 
observations. Thus, examining the industry-level effect of retaliatory motives on the 
use of antidumping in developing countries will be left for future work when data is 
available.  
Furthermore, among 46 affected countries, 26 of them are developed countries and the 
rest are developing countries23. Since developed countries used to be the main 
antidumping users, this preliminarily provides evidence on the retaliatory motive that 
may explain developing countries’ use of antidumping instrument. On the other hand, 
it is noticeable that 43.5% of affected countries are developing economies. This 
implies that developing countries are beginning to target each other with antidumping 
investigations. Some questions are opened here. What accounts for the rise in intra-
developing country antidumping actions? And what are the consequences of this 
growing problem? Within this thesis, these questions are not answered. Again, these 
issues will be left for future work.  
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